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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the constitutive notions of intellectual property is the public
domain. This is the ideas, notions, and works that are usable by all, where
no person can invoke a right to block use by another. I will be focusing
on copyright here, but of course the idea of the public domain is also at
work in other areas of intellectual property. Defining the precise
boundaries of the copyright public domain in the United States takes real
work, and there are obviously hotly contested, high-level legal issues
about those boundaries, such as those at stake in Eldred v. Ashcroft and
Golan v. Holder.1
My interests here are more mundane. I am interested in the mechanics
of accessing the public domain and the consequences of the choices that
we make about the operational effectiveness of various tools available
for controlling access to the public domain. This matters both for the
extent of access but also importantly for the scale and scope of competition
in the provision of the public domain. This takes us to contract and
terms of use; to the core of copyright in what it means to be original and
also what it means to copy; to copyright’s periphery in the form of the
deposit requirement; to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
and its tools of distant control; and to the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA) and its restrictions on accessing materials and objects under
local control. With the emergence of major digital scanning projects for
works in the public domain—call these online public domain repositories
(OPDRs)—we are at a point of possibly unparalleled practical access to
the public domain. But the decisions we make about the tools just described
will have a strong effect on the scope of the actual access to the public
domain that emerges and will also determine the extent to which we will
see meaningful competition in providing and using the public domain.
We face standard conflicts about the limits of appropriability, the efforts
to expand appropriation, and the possible consequences of those efforts
for effective access to the public domain and overall welfare. Many
institutions undertaking major scanning projects will have their interests
first and foremost in mind. Some of those interests will relate to the
substantial costs associated with digitizing works and hosting them.
Those costs have to be financed, and fully unfettered access to the public
domain may be inconsistent with that financing.

1.
(2003).
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That said, there is a broader set of questions that I am interested in,
namely, exactly how unpropertied is the public domain? I confess that I
am not sure that “property” as such is necessarily even the right framing
for that question, but it does capture some of what is at stake. We think
of the public domain as open to all and in that sense owned by no one—
or owned by all. But that ignores the question of how the public domain
is actually accessed. We have many tools that control that access, and in
that sense, through those tools, we reestablish a shadow-control regime
for the public domain. And we are at the early stages of architecting
competition in digital libraries, and one piece of that process will be
assessing the mechanisms for controlling access to the public domain.
Part II of this Article sketches out the emerging public domain. Part III
considers three conceptual questions for structuring use of the public
domain, focusing on the extent to which the public domain should be viral;
on whether we should insist that the public domain be accessed only
through the original artifacts embodying it; and on whether private
appropriability incentives for distribution of public domain scans match
overall social interests. Part IV turns to the tools for restricting use of
the public domain, to copyright, contract, the DMCA, and the CFAA.
Each of these matters for access to the public domain and for competition
over it. Part V considers one narrow question regarding the relationship
between copyright’s deposit requirement and a truly public public
domain, while the last Part briefly concludes the Article.
II. THE EMERGING PUBLIC DOMAIN
We should probably start with a quick synopsis of the core features of
the copyright public domain in the United States. Works of the U.S.
government enter the public domain immediately on creation.2 Under
long-standing case law, it is generally understood that other governmental
works, including those of state actors, are in the public domain as well,
though the statutory hook for that in the current copyright law is less
clear than one might like.3 Works published in the United States before
1923 are in the public domain, as may be a variety of other works

2. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
3. The Veeck case is the most interesting, serious recent look at this issue, and it
offers a tour of the relevant cases. See generally Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 293
F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

1185

depending on how well the ins and outs of copyright formalities and
renewal schemes were navigated over time.4
At a more conceptual level, ideas and facts are in the public domain as
well.5 You can’t copy the entire expression in a new nonfiction text
work unless you are willing to make a pretty aggressive fair use argument,
but separate from fair use, the noncopyrightability of fact and ideas
means that most of the meat in a nonfiction text work is immediately
available for use by all on publication. There will be interesting boundary
cases—Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises is a good
example6—but nonfiction texts release an enormous amount of content
into the public domain on publication. Use of textual fiction is much
more limited, and matters again get more complicated as we move from
text to photographs, audio, or video. To be sure, we could imagine a much
larger public domain, and the duration of a copyright has a direct and
important effect on the size of the public domain, but the size of the
public domain grows day by day.
But having work in the public domain and actually being able to use it
are two quite different matters. Use requires access, and copyright isn’t
a true access regime. I will address the deposit requirement in Part V
below, but I think that it’s fair to say that the deposit rules haven’t ensured
widespread availability of copyrighted works, be those works that remain in
copyright or works that have moved from copyright to the public domain.
Instead, the public domain is distributed and is often scattered throughout
libraries across the country. Library collection accession and deaccession
practices over time will determine the practical availability of a public
domain tied to physical formats.
You can get a sense of this casually by picking an obscure public domain
work and searching WorldCat.org to see how the work is distributed
physically. Of course, interlibrary loan practices will matter importantly
in assessing the practical availability of the public domain. And that
inquiry is framed as one in which you have a particular title in mind and
just need to track down a copy of that work. Many inquiries—the kinds
of searches we do every day on Google and other search engines—are
just unavailable on physical works. Of course, there have always been

4. The Cornell University Copyright Information Center maintains a very helpful
guide on public domain status. See Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright Term and the Public
Domain in the United States, CORNELL U. COPYRIGHT INFO. CENTER (Jan. 1, 2012),
http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349 (1991).
6. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(rejecting fair use argument by magazine that published verbatim quotes from as-of-yet
unpublished presidential memoir).
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indexing services like the Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature or the
Social Sciences Citation Index,7 but even once those moved online,
searching an indexed work is quite different from full-text searching of
the underlying works.
And it is an online, full-text-search public domain that is being created
in the form of online public domain repositories. Consider briefly nine
prominent projects:
• The British Newspaper Archive: The British Library is bringing
300 years of newspapers online. Newspapers are the day-today stories of our lives and provide an unparalleled way of
accessing the past. With the November 2011 launch of the
British Newspaper Archive, more than four million pages of
scans came online, searchable for free and downloadable for a
fee as PDFs.8
• ProQuest Historical Newspapers: ProQuest offers an
extensive—it boasts of nearly thirty million digitized pages—
searchable collection of historical newspapers, including nineteen
general interest U.S. papers. For many newspapers, including
The Arizona Republican, the Cincinnati Enquirer, and the
Detroit Free Press, the only content offered is pre-1923 public
domain content. And if content nearing a century old isn’t
enough to excite you, read the Nashville Tennessean, which
starts in 1812. For other newspapers, such as The New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal, ProQuest offers public domain
content and, pursuant to licenses, in-copyright content.9 ProQuest
is offered on a subscription basis to libraries.
• The Internet Archive (the Archive): The Internet Archive is
amassing a digital library of the Web, movies, live music,
audio recordings, and texts. Its Web archive offers the Wayback
Machine: travel back in time on the Internet to see what your
7. See Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature, EBSCOHOST, http://www.ebscohost.
com/academic/readers-guide-to-periodical-literature (last visited Nov. 16, 2012); Social
Sciences Citation Index, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/
science/science_products/a-z/social_sciences_citation_index/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
8. See Amar Toor, British Library Digitizes 300 Years Worth of Newspaper Archives,
Brings 65 Million Articles Online, ENGADGET (Nov. 30, 2011, 8:41 AM), http://www.
engadget.com/2011/11/30/british-library-digitizes-300-years-worth-of-newspaperarchives/.
9. See ProQuest Historical Newspapers, PROQUEST, http://www.proquest.com/en
-US/catalogs/databases/detail/pq-hist-news.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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favorite website looked like on a particular date. But the
archive also offers more than three million texts for reading
and downloading. Old works, such as Little Goody Two Shoes,
published in 1766, are very much alive at the Internet Archive.10
• JSTOR: Every academic knows and loves JSTOR, online at
jstor.org. Most of the content digitized by JSTOR is in copyright
and is digitized through a license with the copyright holder, but
roughly six percent of the JSTOR content—nearly 500,000
articles—is in the public domain.11 JSTOR terms this content
“Early Journal Content” and on September 7, 2011, announced a
plan to unbundle the public domain content from the in-copyright
content and make that public domain content available to all
for free.12
• Google Book Search (GBS): When Google announced its new
Google Print Service at the Frankfurt Book Fair in October
2004, it was clear that Google was taking a big step forward to
fulfill its mission statement: “to organize the world’s information
and make it universally accessible and useful.”13 That has been a
bumpy process—and the litigation over it is ongoing—but
Google hosts millions of public domain works in GBS.14
• HathiTrust: On October 13, 2008, two leading academic
library consortia joined forces to announce the creation of the
HathiTrust.15 Libraries have been doing scanning on their
own, but libraries who are partners in the GBS project also get
back copies of scans from Google, subject to restrictions
detailed below. As of late 2012, the HathiTrust held more than
10.5 million volumes, with over 3.2 million public domain
volumes.16

10. See Free Books, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://archive.org/details/texts (last visited
Nov. 16, 2012).
11. See Early Journal Content, JSTOR, http://about.jstor.org/service/early-journalcontent (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
12. See JSTOR—Free Access to Early Journal Content and Serving “Unaffiliated”
Users, JSTOR (Sept. 7, 2011), http://about.jstor.org/news/jstor%E2%80%93free-accessearly-journal-content-and-serving-%E2%80%9Cunaffiliated%E2%80%9D-users.
13. See Company Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2012).
14. See About Google Books: History of Google Books, GOOGLE, http://books.google.
com/intl/en/googlebooks/history.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
15. Major Library Partners Launch HathiTrust Shared Digital Repository,
HATHITRUST (Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.hathitrust.org/press_10-13-2008.
16. See Statistics Information, HATHITRUST, http://hathitrust.org/statistics_info (last
visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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• THOMAS: Works of the federal government enter the public
domain on creation.17 That covers quite a bit, but note
immediately that it covers all works of Congress and the federal
court system. In 1995, the Library of Congress launched
THOMAS—named in honor of Thomas Jefferson—as its
window into congressional materials.18
• Google Scholar: THOMAS doesn’t cover the work of federal
courts. Although the U.S. Supreme Court now issues its opinions
online as released, it has backfiled only to Volume 502 of the
United States Reports, the official reporter for Supreme Court
opinions. If you are interested in case law in the first 500
volumes, you are out of luck. Law libraries are full of shelf
after shelf of published opinions, and Westlaw and Lexis brought
those opinions online, though often at very high prices.19
Google has now brought many of these opinions online and has
made them available for free at scholar.google.com.20
• Bodleian Library and the Bibloteca Apostolica Vaticana: On
April 12, 2012, these two libraries, based respectively at the
University of Oxford and the Vatican, announced a plan to
digitize 1.5 million pages of ancient texts held in their
collections.21
I could add more, but you get the point. The public domain is being
assembled, digitized, and made available to the public. These online
repositories—online libraries?—represent the possibility of a huge step
forward in the day-to-day practical availability of the public domain.22
17. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
18. See About THOMAS, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/abt_thom.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
19. See Lexis.com, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexis.page
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012); Products A-Z: Westlaw, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomson
reuters.com/products_services/legal/legal_products/a-z/westlaw/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
20. See About Google Scholar, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, http://scholar.google.com/intl
/en/scholar/about.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
21. Bodleian and Vatican Libraries To Digitise Ancient Texts, BODLEIAN LIBR.
(Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/news/bodleian-and-the-vatican-libraries/.
22. Do note that although both Google and HathiTrust have faced litigation for their
efforts, that litigation relates to the digitization of in-copyright works and not of public domain
works. See Jennifer Howard, Publishers Settle Long-Running Lawsuit over Google’s BookScanning Project, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 4, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/
Publishers-Settle-Long-Running/134854/; Austen Hufford, ‘U’ Wins Copyright Lawsuit
Against Hathitrust Digitalization Project, MICH. DAILY (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.
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III. STRUCTURING USE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
I want to start by considering some preliminary conceptual questions
about the use of the public domain. I want to address three issues. First,
does the fact that a subsequent work incorporates the public domain have
any consequence for the status of the first work? The strong version of
this argument would embrace a notion of a viral public domain along the
lines of the licensing approaches taken in open-source software. Second,
to head to the other extreme, I want to address to what extent use of the
public domain is subject to an original source requirement. Can you access
the public domain through my republication of it, or must you track
down an original to access the public domain? Third, I want to consider
the extent to which social and private incentives line up in the distribution
of content, including public domain content. Limits on appropriability may
mean that content possessors will take steps through contract, technical
protection measures, and the like to limit subsequent use inefficiently just
because it boosts their ability to appropriate value from the content
somewhat.
A. A Viral Public Domain?
We have seen a number of efforts over the last two decades to create
viral ecosystems of property. The best known examples of these are the
original GNU General Public License (GPL) and its successors and the
licenses of the Creative Commons. Somewhat ironically, these “copyleft”
approaches rely on copyright itself to impose conditions on those who
use prior work. The heart of the GPL is the fact that it is viral or infectious.
To simplify considerably, if you use code subject to a GPL, the work
you in turn create has to be just as useable by others as was the code that
you started with. The idea is to plant a GPL code seed and watch the
code base expand around it, always increasing the amount of code available
for use on GPL terms. It is the way in which use of the first software
attaches conditions to the new software enabling further use of that software
that makes the GPL viral.23
It is very much counterfactual to imagine a fully viral public domain.
Start with nonfiction. Would my inclusion of public domain facts somehow
mean that my otherwise copyrightable expression would have to enter
the public domain? That would seem to completely exclude copyright in
michigandaily.com/news/10-hathitrust-ruling-11. In-copyright works pose very different
issues.
23. For a detailed discussion, see Brett Smith, A Quick Guide to GPLv3, GNU
OPERATING SYS., http://www.gnu.org/licenses/quick-guide-gplv3.html (last updated June
10, 2012).
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nonfiction text. We could imagine freestanding new works of fiction—a
new poem, perhaps—but we can imagine the line-drawing problems that
would arise.
And the idea that use of any public domain material puts the resulting
work in the public domain would have dramatic consequences. Disney
released its animated classic Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs in 1937.24
The first full-length Disney animated film, cel by hand-drawn cel, Snow
White’s story was told again. Again, because as everyone knows, her story
was an old one going back in print to at least 1812 in the Grimm
Brothers’ fairy tale Little Snow-White.25 Her tale isn’t a long one—sixand-a-half pages in an 1884 English edition26—but Disney made the
most of it in making an eighty-three-minute film and unadjusted domestic
grosses of almost $185 million.27 And Hollywood went back to the well
again with the release in 2012 of two Snow White movies.28 It is hard to
imagine any of this work getting created with a viral public domain.
And of course, we don’t take a GPL-like approach to the public domain
in the United States. The copyright statute itself does not really address
this, but we might find an analog in 17 U.S.C. § 103.29 That section
addresses situations in which new copyrighted material and old copyrighted
material are mixed together.30 Assuming that you have permission to
use the old material, as a creator, you receive copyright in the new
material and not the old material. This is what we should anticipate: we
would create very odd incentives if incorporation of prior material stripped
new material of its copyright protection. New works would need to be

24. Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, INTERNET M OVIE D ATABASE , http://www.
imdb.com/title/tt0029583/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
25. See D. L. Ashliman, Little Snow-White, U. P ITT. (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.
pitt.edu/~dash/type0709.html#snowwhite.
26. JACOB & WILHELM GRIMM, GRIMM’S FAIRY TALES 124–30 (Alice Gleason ed.,
Margaret Hunt trans., Dover Publ’ns 2007) (1884).
27. And adjusted for ticket-price inflation, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs
grossed roughly $865 million, tenth on the all-time list. See All Time Box Office:
Domestic Grosses Adjusted for Ticket Price Inflation, BOX OFF. MOJO, http://boxoffice
mojo.com/alltime/adjusted.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 2012).
28. Mirror Mirror, starring Julia Roberts, was released on March 30, 2012. See Mirror
Mirror, BOX OFF. MOJO, http://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=untitledsnowwhite.htm
(last updated Nov. 15, 2012). Snow White and the Huntsman, with Charlize Theron as
the evil queen, was released July 1, 2012. See Snow White and the Huntsman, BOX OFF.
MOJO, http://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=snowwhiteandthehuntsman.htm (last updated
Nov. 15, 2012).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
30. Id.

1191

vacuum-packed and carefully sealed to ensure that no public domain
content had somehow snuck in.
As to digital scans, we should anticipate that when scans are done
well, nothing new is added to them. That may limit the extent to which
copyright can protect the scans themselves—I address this below—but
the fact that I include public domain content in a new work doesn’t in
and of itself somehow limit the scope of protection I can enjoy for that
work. I get what I get, and the fact that the work is somehow derived
from work in the public domain in no way limits the protection that I
enjoy for my work. This line of analysis should limit the idea that some
consequence attaches to the use of public domain work in the new digital
scans, something I think of as the “the works were in the public domain
and therefore” argument. I don’t think copyright itself fills in anything
after the therefore.
B. Original Sources, Derivative Sources, and Copying
the Public Domain
As we scan public domain works, we face something of a conundrum
as to what it means to copy a work. Suppose that we were to conclude that
a scan itself was an independently copyrightable object. For concreteness,
consider a poem, say Casey at the Bat, written by Ernest Lawrence Thayer
and first published in the San Francisco Examiner on June 3, 1888.31
A search on Google Books turns up many copies of the poem, some
published in books still in copyright, while others, such as the 1911 America’s
National Game by Albert G. Spalding, have entered the public domain.32
Suppose that Google claimed a copyright in the new digitized object
that it has created. Where would that put us? What would that copyright
limit? The poem is presented in full on the screen so that I can read it.
I might be able to take a screen capture of the poem and then set about
extracting the text of the poem from the screen capture. Were I to succeed
in doing that, I would end up with just the text of the poem, and the
poem itself, of course, is in the public domain. Even if I wasn’t able to
bring to bear the technical wizardry of capture and extraction, I could
just type the poem into my computer by hand. Again, in each case, I have
copied the poem to be sure, and that would be a copyright violation save
for the fact that the poem is in the public domain.
31. See Casey at the Bat by Ernest Thayer, BASEBALL ALMANAC, http://www.baseballalmanac.com/poetry/po_case.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
32. Search Results for “Casey at the Bat,” GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com
(search for “Casey at the Bat”; then follow “Search Books” hyperlink). Spalding recounts the
initial publication of the poem and the public’s reaction to it. See Albert G. Spalding,
AMERICA’S NATIONAL GAME 449–54 (Am. Sports Publ’g Co. 1911).
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But what have I done vis-à-vis the new digitized object? We could
imagine a regime that barred access to the public domain through the
scan. Obviously, there are always proof problems, though in these
circumstances, creators often seed their content with unimportant intentional
mistakes in an effort to make proof of copying easier. A regime that
required subsequent firms to duplicate the efforts of the first firm in
tracking down an original artifact containing the public domain work
would obviously maximally protect the efforts of the first firm in doing
just that. If tracking down and copying the public domain is expensive,
we might need an original source—or, put differently, a no-accessthrough—regime to ensure that the public domain was rediscovered in the
first place. Of course, requiring duplication of effort means that we are
rebuilding the wheel each time we want a competing copy of the public
domain scan. This is a key point in how we structure competing uses of
the public domain.
Prior to Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,33
there was a strand of analysis in the cases that came close to this regime.
The line drawn barred a subsequent user from extracting the public
domain content from a particular text and instead required the second
user to gather the user’s own version of the public domain facts. Once
those facts were in hand, the second user could use the first public
domain copy as a tool for checking the new, second accumulation of
facts.34 But in Feist, the “industrious collection” of facts was found to
be insufficient for copyright, and full-blown copying of public domain
content was permitted even if that took place through a new copyrighted
work.35 It seems clear as a matter of copyright proper that the public
domain original can be accessed through a scan without running afoul of
copyright even if we were to assign a copyright to the scan itself.36
33. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
34. See, e.g., Rockford Maps Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colo., 768
F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The second compiler must assemble the material as if
there had never been a first compilation; only then may the second compiler use the first
as a check on error.”).
35. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348 (“Thus, if the compilation author clothes facts with an
original collocation of words, he or she may be able to claim a copyright in this written
expression. Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not the
precise words used to present them.”).
36. This idea works most naturally when we are talking about accessing text
through a scan. Matters become more interesting if we switch from text to images, but
sorting through that isn’t really the point of this Article. I talk about some of these issues
in a blog post. See Randy Picker, Fairey v. Associated Press: Yes He Can, U. CHI. L.
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C. Appropriability Incentives and the Public Domain
We know that spillovers—positive externalities—are an important
feature of intellectual property works. The fact that use of the works is
nonrivalrous means that from the perspective of creators, without more,
they will capture only a fraction of the value that they create, and much
of the value will spill over to third parties. To be just slightly more
concrete about that in the context here, in a nonfiction text work, the
author controls only her expression of the underlying facts and ideas, but
those facts and ideas themselves enter the public domain and thereby
spill over. The spillover point, of course, means that there may be
insufficient private incentives to create socially valuable works. But the
spillover point is general. Here I want to consider the extent to which a
creator might be willing to destroy social value to boost appropriability.
The point isn’t to destroy value, of course, but more that given incomplete
appropriability, the creator won’t take into account destroyed social
value in his or her efforts to grab a larger slice of the pie.
Take a simple situation to see these issues. A creator can take a step
to create a work. Doing so, absent more, will result in value of 6 to the
creator and an additional value of 10 to the rest of society. The 10
represents external benefits from the creation of the work. There is an
additional tool available to the creator—in the Part below I will discuss
technical protection measures, contractual provisions, and other means—
that would boost her take from 6 to 7, but at the cost of reducing the
external benefits to 5. How should we assess this additional restriction?
We can’t say. If we knew that the creator would create the work even
without the provision—receiving 6 was enough of a motivation—then
we would do better to have a pie of 16 created, assuming we are neutral
about how benefits are distributed. The creator would have a private
incentive to adopt the restriction, but that would be a bad outcome
because she would be destroying four units of value just to get one more.
But if 6 is an insufficient motivation to get the work created and 7 will
do the trick, then we are clearly better off to have the restriction imposed.
We can see the problem for law. On the one hand, when appropriability
is incomplete or imperfect, creators will be willing to destroy social
value, sometimes at a high cost, in an effort to boost appropriability.
Creators may be willing to inflict high social losses even for modest
gains to themselves. But, to go to the other hand, barring these restrictions
will shrink overall welfare if the incremental appropriability is actually
marginal for the creation of the work in the first place. The question is
SCH. FAC. BLOG (Feb. 10, 2009, 5:15 PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/
2009/02/fairey-v-associated-press-yes-he-can.html.

1194

Access and Public Domain

[VOL. 49: 1183, 2012]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

how to operationalize these notions. I will try to do more of that below
as I talk through particular examples.
IV. THE TOOLS OF CONTROLLING ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Assembling libraries of public domain materials involves substantial
amounts of time and effort. Given that, we can hardly be surprised when
digitizers look for tools to protect their investments. I will consider four
plausible tools available to digitizers: copyright; contracts and terms of
use; the DMCA; and the CFAA.
A. Copyright
The average digital scan is in some basic sense a photograph of a
piece of paper, so we should review quickly the basics of copyright in
photographs. We start, of course, with the Supreme Court’s 1884 decision
in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony and Sarony’s photograph of
Oscar Wilde.37 Burrow-Giles helped itself to that photograph and then
defended its use on the ground that the photograph was a “mere mechanical
reproduction” and hence insufficiently original to qualify for copyright
protection.38 The Court acknowledged that that might be the case for the
“ordinary production of a photograph,” though it declined to conclude
that no copyright would attach even then.39 But Sarony had done much
more in creating the photograph of Wilde: Sarony had composed the
picture, arranged Wilde’s pose and the setting for it, adjusted the lighting
and shading, and all of that together represented an original creation by
Sarony.40
But the line that Burrow-Giles seemed to suggest—we should look for
originality in the creation of the subject of the photograph—went by-theby as courts embraced copyright in uncreated subjects, such as outdoor
settings like the New York Public Library.41 As soon as we took that
path, we were going to have huge numbers of original photographs. Go

37. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 53–54 (1884).
38. Id. at 59.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 54–55.
41. See, e.g., Pagano v. Chas. Beseler Co., 234 F. 963, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). Justin
Hughes regards this expansive approach to the copyrightablity of photographs as a mistake.
See Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s Copyright—Photograph as Art, Photograph as
Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 327, 329–30 (2012).
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to a party, take a bunch of pictures, create original copyrighted works.
Indeed, the more interesting question quickly becomes: What does an
unoriginal photograph look like? Burrow-Giles could of course have
copied the Sarony photograph of Wilde by getting Wilde to repose and
by making sure that every aspect of the new photograph matched the old
one. That would be as much a copy of the Sarony photograph—and
therefore unoriginal—as what Burrow-Giles did in the actual case.
Next, have Burrow-Giles take a photograph of Sarony’s photograph of
Wilde. That is just as much a copy of the original photograph as when
Burrow-Giles recreated the picture per my hypothetical. That photograph
of the photograph should be treated as a copy of the original photograph
and unoriginal. You could, of course, make an original photograph that
incorporated the Sarony photograph—perhaps with the photograph
surrounded by other objects—but a pure photo of the photo should be
treated as a copy. When you take such a photo of a copyrighted photo,
you infringe. When the original photo is no longer copyrighted because
it has entered the public domain, your photo doesn’t infringe, but it doesn’t
cease to be a copy and it still lacks originality.
Where does that put digital scans of public domain texts? We are
starting to see skirmishes over photographs and scans of public domain
works. The British National Portrait Gallery (NPG) got into a spat with
Wikipedia when Derrick Coetzee, a Wikipedia participant, uploaded onto
Wikipedia digital images created by the NPG of public domain works in
its collection.42 Actual case law is scarce, with Bridgeman Art Library,
Ltd. v. Corel Corp., a 1999 federal district court decision, as a leading
case.43 The court characterized the dispute as one over “‘slavish copies’
of public domain works of art” and concluded that such copies lacked
the spark of originality and therefore could not be copyrighted.44
As a freestanding proposition, it is hard to see how we could think of a
digital scan as having sufficient originality to enjoy copyright protection.
The essence of a high-quality digital scan of a text is perfect fidelity to
the underlying physical page. A bad scan introduces imperfections, and
systematic deviations from the original physical page might be original,
but those aren’t the scans that we hope our digital curators are making.
But retrace our steps as to copyrights in photographs to see how we
have done and focus not on the single digital scan but instead consider a
42. Rory Cellan-Jones, Wikipedia Painting Row Escalates, BBC NEWS, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8156268.stm (last updated July 17, 2009). Some of the correspondence in the
case can be found online at User:Dcoetzee/NPG Legal Threat, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, http://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Dcoetzee/NPG_legal_threat (last modified July 20, 2010).
43. See Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
44. Id. at 197.
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continuum of original photographs. Put the fully posed and staged Sarony
photograph of Wilde perhaps at one end of the continuum. Move to
photographs of objects such as the Grand Canyon or the White House.
Consider a rose in your back yard. At least as conventionally understood,
copyright will subsist in each of those photographs. You might think of
a photograph of a rose in your backyard as probably nothing more than a
slavish copy of the rose, and yet it is hard to imagine that a court would
find insufficient originality in the photo. Yet a photo of a photo will
probably be found to be nothing more than a copy of the original work,
infringing or not depending on whether the work has entered the public
domain, but almost certainly lacking sufficient originality for the second
photo or scan to be independently copyrightable.
B. Terms of Use and Contract
As noted above, we should expect those digitizing public domain
content to use contract to limit how the resulting scans are used. That is
exactly what we see in practice. We need to map out the Terms of Service
(TOS) and contract space a little before examining it in detail. Some
OPDRs are privately held and operate for profit but are generally available
to the public—for example, Google Book Search. That access may be
conditional in that a TOS or contract may apply at various points of use.
Other OPDRs are operated by nonprofits—JSTOR, HathiTrust, and the
Internet Archive—but may offer different levels of access to members
and nonmembers (HathiTrust and JSTOR prior to its recent unbundling
of its public domain works) or may offer equal access to the public (the
Internet Archive) again subject to possible TOS or contract limits at the
point of actual use.
As all of that suggests, the breadth of access to the public is a complex
pattern. Because Google uses a two-sided financing model—advertisers
pay to reach consumers—public access is full, though it comes with
standard Google issues regarding privacy and tracking, but, to be clear,
you can use GBS anonymously. ProQuest, our other private firm, charges
users directly, and that means much more limited access to the public.
HathiTrust’s limits on the public domain to nonmembers appear to be at
least partially derived from the fact that many of its public domain scans
are traceable to underlying contracts with Google, and as detailed below,
those contracts imposed restrictions on Google’s library partners. For
most of its life, JSTOR had operated with a bundled access model: access
to in-copyright works was bundled with access to public domain works.
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Even though JSTOR is a nonprofit, it needs to finance its operations and
thus charges members fees for access to its databases. JSTOR has a rich
approach to licensing—you can mix and match across multiple
collections—but it had not separately unbundled a public domain collection
and made that available to the public until 2011. All of that describes
the general structure of access to the OPDRs. Actual use is subject to
more detailed restrictions.
1. JSTOR
Consider that favorite of the academic researcher, jstor.org.45 JSTOR
provides scans of academic works in many fields. Of course, much of
that work is in copyright, but the pre-1923 U.S. work is in the public
domain.46 And JSTOR makes some of that work available for free to the
public. But when you try to download a public domain work, you
are presented with terms. You are told “[y]our use of the JSTOR archive
indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions,” with a
link to those terms.47 If you don’t click in acceptance, you can’t download
the public domain work. And if you want to read the terms, get a cup of
coffee first: it runs 7,544 words.48
Consider just the special codicil for what JSTOR terms “Early Journal
Content.” This is content published in journals prior to 1923 in the
United States or prior to 1870 if initially published internationally.49
JSTOR “encourages broad use” of this content, but although users are
“free to copy, use, and redistribute” this content, that use is limited to
noncommercial purposes, and JSTOR asks that you attribute the content
to JSTOR.50 JSTOR also addresses bulk downloads: “Please be considerate
of other users and do not use robots or other devices or coordinate
activity to systematically download these works as this may be
disruptive to our systems.”51

45. For background on JSTOR, see generally ROGER C. SCHONFELD, JSTOR:
A HISTORY (2003).
46. Early Journal Content, supra note 11.
47. See, e.g., Cover Page to Barbara Celarent, Review of A Dying Colonialism by
Frantz Fanon, CHI. JOURNALS, http://home.uchicago.edu/~aabbott/barbpapers/barbfanon.pdf
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (displaying JSTOR’s typical language that appears when a user
seeks to download a work).
48. See Terms and Conditions of Use, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/
policies/terms.jsp (last updated Nov. 15, 2012).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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2. Google Book Search
Public domain downloads from the GBS project come with similar
limitations set forth in the first page of the file. Google offers something
of a paean to the public domain. The public domain book that you have
downloaded, you are told, “is a digital copy of a book that was preserved
for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by
Google as part of a project to make the world’s books discoverable
online.”52 Google goes on to explain that “[a] public domain book is one
that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has
expired. . . . Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing
a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that’s often difficult to
discover.”53 And “[p]ublic domain books belong to the public and we are
merely their custodians.”54
And with one word, the tone and content shift: “Nevertheless.”
Nevertheless meaning that the scanning of the public domain is something
like a quarter of a billion-dollar undertaking and Google has an investment
to protect. “Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep
providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by
commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated
querying.”55 You are requested to use the files for only “personal, noncommercial purposes.”56 You are told to “[r]efrain from automated
querying” and to maintain the Google watermark embedded in each file.57
The watermark “is essential for informing people about this project and
helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search.”58

52. These quotes are taken from the front page that Google attached to the
downloadable PDF of LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (London,
MacMillan & Co. 1898) (1865), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=CloNAAAA
YAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false (click on the “Tools” sprocket near
the upper-righthand corner of the page; then follow the “Download PDF” hyperlink in
the drop-down menu).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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3. Internet Archive
The Archive is an important, freestanding nonprofit effort to create a
digital repository for the artifacts of the Internet Age. The Archive
offers a number of key tools. Want to see how the Google homepage has
evolved over time? Go visit the Archive’s Wayback Machine.59 But, as
noted above, the Archive also has an extensive collection of public
domain works, and all of that comes with a terms of use (TOU).60 You
are to use the archive for “scholarship and research purposes only.”61
Presumably, commercial use is forbidden. The TOU doesn’t seem to
address automated querying or bulk downloading directly, but it does
bar you from doing anything “to interfere with the work of other users or
Archive personnel, servers, or resources.” 62 And the Archive wants
attribution for its contribution to your research.63
4. HathiTrust
The HathiTrust (Hathi) imposes a number of key limits on the public
domain works that it hosts.64 These limits reflect the origins of many of
the works that arose through the deals cut by Google with its academic
library partners. Under those deals, libraries would be entitled under
some circumstances to receive back their own digital copies, but often
subject to substantial contractual restrictions.65 Hathi has emerged as a
key way for those libraries to navigate their obligations to Google. In
addition to that, Hathi has its own cost model and imposes restrictions
on use to support that model.66 For the public domain works, this means
that these “volumes are freely accessible to the public and can be
downloaded in their entirety with authentication by persons affiliated
with partner institutions.”67
59. See Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://archive.org/web/web.php
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
60. Internet Archive’s Terms of Use, Privacy Policy, and Copyright Policy,
INTERNET ARCHIVE (Mar. 10, 2001), http://archive.org/about/terms.php.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (“In addition, we request that, according to standard academic practice, if
you use the Archive’s Collections for any research that results in an article, a book, or
other publication, you list the Archive as a resource in your bibliography.”).
64. Access and Use Policies, HATHITRUST, http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
65. See R ICKY E RWAY , OCLC R ESEARCH, I MPACT OF THE G OOGLE B OOK
SETTLEMENT ON LIBRARIES 4 (2009), available at http://www.oclc.org/resources/research
/publications/library/2009/2009-01.pdf.
66. See Cost, HATHITRUST, http://www.hathitrust.org/cost (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
67. Features and Benefits, HATHITRUST, http://www.hathitrust.org/features_benefits
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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5. Summing Up OPDR Terms of Use
We see a number of limits that run across these situations. One bars
copying at scale: you aren’t allowed to simply copy all of the public
domain documents and replicate the original service. From one perspective,
you might think that these services would welcome wholesale copying.
Some of the downloads would be diverted to other sites, and the original
sites would save some of the download and hosting costs. Yet our OPDRs
routinely bar bulk downloading.
It seems clear that the OPDRs value control over the public domain
works they have amassed. Some of this goes to the revenue opportunities
associated with these works. Google could serve ads and collect
information through the hosting of works. That seems less true of the
Internet Archive, but the Archive seems to value attribution and may
believe that that interest is more likely to be vindicated if users have to
come to the Archive to see works. Hathi’s limits may be derivative of
the original relationship of Hathi’s members with Google. And JSTOR’s
approach on this has evolved from the original bundled model—the
public domain works bundled with in-copyright works—to now allowing
broad access to its public domain materials.
We see a second limit frequently as well: a restriction to noncommercial
use of the materials or research use. We should think of this as an option
on commercial use of the materials. By that I mean that a person desiring to
make commercial use of the materials would be required to negotiate for
rights to use the works in a commercial fashion. The repository would hold
an option on those commercial uses in that it could negotiate for a chunk
of the upside of the new project in exchange for its consent to allow use
of its public domain materials. This really does take us back to a version
of the independent sourcing notion discussed above in Part III.B.68 We
are talking here of commercial use of public domain materials. If you
have independent access to these materials, you need not pay a fee to use
them, but absent that access, a new commercial user might be stuck
paying the repository for access to the public domain.

68.

See supra Part III.B.
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C. DMCA
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act69 is often referred to as a
paracopyright statute in that its approach to protecting copyrighted work
differs substantially from more traditional approaches to copyright.70
The DMCA implements a lock-and-key system for copyrighted works.
To simplify considerably, individuals are barred from trying to unlock
locked works, and to step a level up, the statute also limits trafficking in
tools that facilitate unlocking locked works.71
Digital rights management (DRM) of the sort protected by the DMCA
is controversial. DRM is extensively used by Amazon as part of its Kindle
platform, by Apple in running iTunes through its FairPlay software, and
was baked into the DVD platform in the form of the Content Scramble
System (CSS).72 DRM defenders focus on, among other things, the way
in which lock-and-key systems can support useful cross-product subsidies
between hardware and content, while DRM detractors focus on the use
limits that arise and the way in which DRM can limit after-the-fact
competition, both limits that they regard as objectionable given what
they see as the ease by which DRM schemes can be evaded by the hardcore.
What role should a digital lock-and-key system play for digital scans
of public domain works? We face our usual analysis. For-profit scanners
will want to control the works and, as noted above, may be willing to
sacrifice overall social value to boost appropriability. At the same time,
absent a digital lock, for-profit scanners may be unwilling to see their
scans distributed in the clear. Doing so may make it easier for competitors
to scoop up those scans without having to incur the original costs of
scanning. Many users might not find digital locks problematic and would
prefer to have a downloaded copy rather than one permanently tied to an
online digital repository. That can be about convenience—no need to
have Internet access—but also about privacy or perceived privacy. And

69. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
70. See, e.g., Ethan Ackerman, Still Not Copyright: Para-Copyright Revisited-Blueport v. US, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 31, 2008, 4:37 PM), http://blog.
ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/07/still_not_copyr.htm.
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
72. For information on these, see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429, 436–37 (2d Cir. 2001), which describes CSS; Bryan Bishop, Apple’s FairPlay DRM
for iBooks Cracked by Requiem App, VERGE (Feb. 25, 2012, 10:18 AM), http://www.
theverge.com/2012/2/25/2823218/apples-fairplay-drm-ibooks-cracked-requiem-app; and
Jeremy Greenfield, Bookseller Backed by Big Publishers Advocates Abandoning Digital
Rights Management, DIGITAL BOOK WORLD (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.digitalbookworld.
com/2012/bookseller-backed-by-big-publishers-advocates-abandoning-digital-rightsmanagement/.
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a downloaded copy might be more stable than a copy served through the
OPDR.
Lest all of this be thought a bit hypothetical, consider how Google has
approached the scans in GBS and how its competitors would like access
to those scans. The DMCA comes with many limits, including that the
statute calls for a rulemaking every three years undertaken by the Librarian
of Congress and the Register of Copyrights.73 The target of the rulemaking
is “any class of copyrighted works” such that the digital locks validated
by the DMCA do, or are likely to, adversely affect noninfringing uses of
those classes of work.74 Note that the rulemaking powers call off unlocking
liability but not liability for making or trafficking in tools of unlocking.75
On December 1, 2011, in the current rulemaking proceeding being
conducted by the U.S. Copyright Office, the Open Book Alliance (OBA)
asked the Copyright Office to address digital scans of public domain
works.76 The OBA’s mission is, in its words, to “assert that any mass
book digitization and publishing effort be open and competitive.”77 The
OBA is composed of a mix of tech firms such as Amazon, Microsoft,
and Yahoo!; author groups, such as the American Society of Journalists
and Authors and National Writers’ Union; and reader-facing organizations,
such as the Internet Archive and the New York Library Association.78
To be faithful to its statutory mandate, the Copyright Office classifies
the requests it receives, and it characterizes the OBA request as involving
“[l]iterary works in the public domain that are made available in digital
copies.”79 The OBA in turn sees its request as directed at “prying open
Google’s closed books.”80 As detailed in its December 1, 2011 filing with

73. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
74. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(D).
75. Id.
76. Letter from the Open Book Alliance to the U.S. Copyright Office (Dec. 1,
2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2011/initial/open_book_alliance.pdf.
77. Mission, OPEN BOOK ALLIANCE, http://www.openbookalliance.org/mission/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
78. Members, OPEN BOOK ALLIANCE, http://www.openbookalliance.org/members/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
79. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/1201/
2011/initial/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
80. Prying Open Google’s Closed Books, OPEN BOOK ALLIANCE (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.openbookalliance.org/2011/12/prying-open-google%E2%80%99s-closed-books/
(capitalization altered).
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the Copyright Office, the OBA describes the measures that Google has
undertaken to lock up the scanned books.81
The OBA focuses on the contracts that Google signed with libraries to
set up the rules of the game for digitizing the books held by the libraries.
Those contracts are quite useful because they give a good sense of the
institutional undertaking involved in making the public domain available.
Of course, there is a way in which much of the public domain is just
sitting there somewhere. These are the physical copies of the works that
have entered the public domain. But there is a long, long road from sitting
somewhere to being meaningfully available to all, and Google’s contracts
with the libraries make that crystal clear. That is especially true given that
Google and the libraries have been creating contracts amidst substantial
uncertainty over the copyright foundations of the GBS project.
Our focus here is on the DMCA and the technical locks contemplated
in the agreements with the libraries. Google announced its partnership with
key libraries in mid-December 2004.82 To take just one example, Google
and the University of Michigan signed their original agreement on June
15, 2005,83 and it was subsequently amended on May 20, 2009, to adjust the
agreement after the attempted settlement of the GBS litigation.84
As Google scans, Google and Michigan each get a copy.85 The contract
envisions that Michigan’s copy will be made available through Michigan’s
website and will also be available through cooperative arrangements with
partner research libraries.86 In doing that, Michigan is required to
“implement technological measures (e.g., through the use of the robots.txt
protocol) to restrict automated access” to Michigan’s copies of the scans.87
And Google and Michigan together are to cooperate to develop methods to
ensure that there are no bulk downloads of the digital copies at Michigan.88
Under the original contract, the restrictions on the use of Michigan’s
copy of the scans were independent of the copyright status of the books,
81. Letter from the Open Book Alliance to the U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 76.
82. See Press Release, Google Inc., Google Checks Out Library Books (Dec. 14,
2004), available at http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2004/12/google-checks-out-librarybooks.html.
83. Amendment to Cooperative Agreement, U. MICH. LIBR., http://www.lib.umich.edu/
files/services/mdp/Amendment-to-Cooperative-Agreement.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
84. See the timeline set out at Michigan Digitization Project, U. MICH. LIBR.,
http://www.lib.umich.edu/michigan-digitization-project (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
The settlement of the class action brought by the Authors Guild against Google was
rejected, and that litigation is still pending. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F.
Supp. 2d 666, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
85. See Cooperative Agreement § 2.5, U. MICH. LIBR., http://www.lib.umich.edu/
files/services/mdp/um-google-cooperative-agreement.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
86. Id. §§ 4.4.1–.2.
87. Id. § 4.4.1.
88. Id.
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and works in the public domain faced exactly the same limits as works in
copyright.89 The 2009 amendment adjusted this somewhat given the
proposed class action settlement,90 though that settlement seems dead for
now.
At GBS, public domain books are usually available for download as a
PDF or in the epub format. It isn’t clear to me whether those books, once
downloaded, come subject to some sort of technological protection
measure. But it is clear that independent of that, what really troubles the
OBA are technical protection measures that prevent large-scale downloads
of the scans of public domain works. As the OBA puts it in its filing:
While Google at the moment allows users to manually download individual
PDFs of public domain works at the Google Books site, the stringent TPMs it
imposes with respect to automated access prevent broader use of these files by
competing search engines, digital libraries, and other online providers. It
simply would not be feasible for an organization to make manual downloads of
over three million books.91

To assess this, we should start with law and then turn to policy. We
need to start with 17 U.S.C. § 1201 on circumvention of copyright
protection systems.92 When you read § 1201(a)(1), it is hard to avoid one
conclusion: it simply doesn’t apply to public domain works. Subparagraph
(A) of that section bars any person from circumventing a technological
measure that “effectively controls access to a work protected under this
title.”93 That of course is a reference to the copyright title and, presumably,
to a copyrighted work. The next subparagraph confirms that certain classes
of copyrighted works are exempt from the prior limits if the Librarian of
Congress chooses to exempt them pursuant to the terms of subparagraph
(C).94 That exemption is implemented by having the Librarian publish
“any class of copyrighted works” that are to receive the benefit of the
exemption scheme for a three-year window.95 None of the text applies
naturally to works in the public domain, and § 1201(a)(1) is best read not
to apply to public domain works.
Step back and assess what all of that means. Suppose that I download
a public domain scan to my computer and I discover that it comes subject to
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. §§ 4.4–4.4.2.
See Amendment to Cooperative Agreement, supra note 83, § 18.
Letter from the Open Book Alliance to the U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 76.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 1201(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 1201(a)(1)(D).
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DRM protection. Assuming that the scan itself is not a new copyrighted
work,96 I don’t violate § 1201(a)(1)(A) if I circumvent that measure, as
that section applies only to measures that protect works protected under
Title 17, meaning works in copyright.97 At the same time, the
anticircumvention rulemaking process conducted by the Librarian of
Congress addresses only copyrighted works, so nothing there seems to
empower the Librarian to somehow exempt efforts to crack public domain
scans.
All of that means that the DMCA is not likely to be the source of
either protection for scans or exemptions for people seeking to circumvent
whatever DRM is embedded in the scans, though the DMCA does limit
the overall development of decryption tools, and that may offer some
protection even for public domain scans. Whether that is good or bad
policy is a question that I am skeptical that we are well situated to answer.
This takes us back to the appropriability discussion in Part III.C.98 There
are substantial costs to scan books. I am not sure what the right number
is, but I have seen figures as high as $100 per book.99 The OBA
suggests that Google has scanned three million public domain books and
that would get us quickly to $300 million dollars or exactly the estimated
budget of Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s End.100 Real money to
be sure, but the sort of money that big firms spend with frequency.
The OBA filing argues that “[i]t simply would not be feasible for an
organization to make manual downloads of over three million books.”101
That is an interesting claim. Apparently, it was feasible for an organization
to digitize three million public domain books—that would be Google of
course—but downloading those copies one-by-one is the real stumper.
This seems difficult to understand. I assume that the most expensive
undertaking is organizing and scanning the public domain, the least
expensive a bulk download of someone else’s scans. One-by-one
downloads sit in the middle. Doable, but not as cheap as bulk downloading.
Of course, Google doesn’t want to face a first-mover disadvantage
where it bears the cost of scanning and then second movers free ride on
those scans. We might welcome competition in the scans given the
96. See supra Part IV.A.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
98. See supra Part III.C.
99. The Authors Guild mentions this figure in a filing in its lawsuit against the
HathiTrust. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Pleadings at 4, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV
6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://docs.
justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/newyork/nysdce/1:2011cv06351/384619/55/.
100. See Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s End, BOX OFF. MOJO, http://box
officemojo.com/movies/?id=piratesofthecaribbean3.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012).
101. Letter from the Open Book Alliance to the U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 76.
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complaints about the quality of the scans, but if the scans were perfect,
we shouldn’t want a second set of scans to be made. Of course in that
circumstance, we might imagine that Google might license the scans to
potential entrants where Google and the entrant would split the cost of
doing the second set of scans. The cost of duplicating those scans would
define the size of the pie available to be split in a licensing deal.
Of course, without legal protection for the locks, we can envision a
number of unattractive outcomes. One is a standard cat-and-mouse arms
race, where Google invests in locking the scans and the attackers seek to
unlock them. Although we can learn things of interest during these kinds
of wars, we should think that most of the resources in these tech wars
are wasted. If we validate the locks—as the DMCA does for copyrighted
works but not seemingly for public domain works—we cut off the
unlocking tech war. If we don’t validate the locks, then scanners will
take other steps that we may not like. That may mean that they won’t
allow downloading generally and instead operate the access to the scans
as a service. That possibility would mean that we would not only have
DMCA issues but probably issues under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act as well.
D. CFAA
As passed, the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1984 put in place a targeted regime to protect against
unauthorized access to computers.102 That statute was quite detailed, and
it reached certain information relating to national defense and foreign
relations, certain financial records, and other information on computers
operated by the government. That is actually pretty sizable, but
amendments to the statute greatly expanded its reach and that is our
interest here. The current version of the statute is complicated, but to
take it in its broadest formulation, it treats as a criminal “[w]hoever . . .
intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected
computer.”103 Protected computer is a defined term, as is computer, but
to simplify, that now picks up any computer used in interstate commerce.104
102. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006 & Supp. III 2010).
104. See id. § 1030(e)(1)–(2).
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Meaning any computer on the Internet. The targeted regime of the 1984
Act has become quite broad, and its breadth is now being sorted out in
the courts.
On July 14, 2011, the federal government issued a four-count indictment
against Aaron Swartz alleging wire fraud, computer fraud, unlawfully
obtaining information from a protected computer, and recklessly damaging
a protected computer.105 Swartz was then a twenty-four-year-old Harvard
researcher with a strong record of digital activism.106 Swartz had authored
The Guerilla Open Access Manifesto, in which he set forth a call to
liberate the world’s knowledge from restrictions.107
Swartz argued that those with access to materials had a moral obligation
to share those materials with others by trading passwords and by
downloading files for friends. But Swartz envisioned a more systematic
response to what he termed the “private theft of public culture”:
We need to take information, wherever it is stored, make our copies and share
them with the world. We need to take stuff that’s out of copyright and add it to
the archive. We need to buy secret databases and put them on the Web. We
need to download scientific journals and upload them to file sharing networks.
We need to fight for Guerilla Open Access. 108

According to the indictment, over a four-month period in 2010 and early
2011, Swartz set out to do exactly that by downloading millions of scholarly
works from JSTOR.109
Swartz had the ability to access JSTOR legitimately through his Harvard
position,110 but as detailed above, that access came with many restrictions.
Swartz sidestepped those by going to the Massachussetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) and accessing its network through a guest network
access set up.111 Somewhat surprisingly, the guest access rules at MIT
seemed to allow access to JSTOR and use that access he did to “download
an extraordinary volume of articles from JSTOR.”112
Both JSTOR and MIT responded to this, and this set the usual pattern
of response/counterresponse that we see in these situations.113 As Swartz
was temporarily denied access to JSTOR and MIT resources, Swartz
105. John Schwartz, Open-Access Advocate Is Arrested for Huge Download, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/us/20compute.html.
106. Id.
107. AARON SWARTZ, THE GUERILLA OPEN ACCESS MANIFESTO (2008), available at
http://ia600808.us.archive.org/17/items/GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto/Goamjuly2008.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Indictment ¶ 11, United States v. Swartz, No. 11-CR-10260-NMG (D. Mass.
filed July 14, 2011).
110. Id. ¶ 10.
111. Id. ¶ 14.
112. Id. ¶ 16.
113. Id. ¶ 18.
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pursued other paths. He spoofed the Media Access Control address on
his laptop—used to provide a unique identifier for someone accessing a
network—switched laptops and eventually hard-wired a link into the
network in an MIT communications closet.114 Given the volume of
downloads, it was hard for Swartz’s activities to go on undetected: in
two months, Swartz used one laptop to make two million downloads at
MIT, a volume that was more than one hundred times as great as all of
the legitimate downloads at MIT combined.115
We can now return to our public domain scans. It is clear that the
CFAA applies to a much broader set of information than the DMCA.
The core concern of the CFAA is the invasion of a computer by an outsider
to get at information. Very little of that information may be in copyright, as
it may consist of raw facts and, under Feist, copyright doesn’t attach to
facts.116 A number of CFAA cases have concerned scraping of content
from public websites allegedly in violation of the terms of service of
those websites. Exactly how the authorization provisions of the CFAA
work is a matter of controversy, and the Ninth Circuit’s recent en banc
decision in United States v. Nosal created a conflict in concluding that
the CFAA did not apply to violations of terms of use.117
Taken together, we can see the issues posed by these tools. As
described in Part III.C, amassers of the public domain will have strong
incentives to restrict use to prevent competition.118 And beyond direct
competition, they will seek to restrict use to preserve an option on future
noncompeting uses. That option represents a tax on future innovative
activities, though one cabined to some extent by the possibility of tracking
down an original artifact containing the public domain work. Of course,
that self-help limit works best when we are talking about a single work,
especially if the work isn’t embodied in a unique physical artifact. The
more rare the artifact or the more artifacts that must be accessed, the
harder it will be to duplicate.
At the same time, it is very hard for us to assess how much
propertization is necessary to ensure that our OPDRs have successful
financing models. The common restriction on bulk downloading directly
bars the emergence of easy competition at the same scale but also is fully
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. ¶¶ 18, 21, 26.
Id. ¶ 25.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
See supra Part III.C.
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understandable as a way of supporting the financing model of amassing the
public domain. Absent that, we would have a classic second-moveradvantage collective action problem—“no you scan, no, no why don’t
you go first”—and we can’t all be free riders.
The underlying contract regime then ties into the technical protection
regimes of the DMCA and the CFAA. As written, the DMCA seems to
offer little direct protection for public domain works subject to DRMtype schemes, though the way in which the DMCA limits overall
development of decryption tools may provide some indirect protection
for DRM-wrapped public domain works. With the Nosal decision, the
CFAA seems to be in a state of uncertainty. The CFAA seems to entwine
together technical protections and authorization, and that takes us exactly to
the boundary where our OPDRs will operate.
V. A PUBLIC PUBLIC DOMAIN
In the United States, we are seeing the emergence of a meaningful
private public domain through the efforts of Google, JSTOR, ProQuest,
the Internet Archive, the HathiTrust, and others. This is an interesting
and nice mix of for-profit and nonprofit organizations. And if we focus
on the scope of actual access by the public to the public domain, a great
deal has been accomplished. Google has made nearly three million
volumes available to all for free, subject, to be sure, to advertising and
privacy concerns, though, again, GBS can be used fully anonymously.
Google could close GBS tomorrow, and it is reported that its scanning
efforts have slowed down, though that would be expected at some point
in the project, and the slowdown doesn’t necessarily reflect the overhang
of the ongoing litigation over GBS.
JSTOR has made its slice of the public domain available to the public,
though again nothing would prevent JSTOR from taking back and
limiting access to the public domain. The ProQuest treasure trove—and
I have mentioned only the historical newspapers, but ProQuest has much
more, including a historical database of company annual reports—is a
big piece of the public domain not available to the public generally,
though ProQuest is eager to license its databases to public libraries. Of
course, libraries make acquisition trade-offs all of the time, and a library
not licensing ProQuest’s public domain materials is making exactly that
sort of choice.
But none of these are true public organizations like the great public
libraries, and each runs an access model that reflects the need to pay the
bills. The natural alternative is a government-funded public library, the
digital equivalent of the public libraries in communities across the country.
In the United States, this might be housed at the Library of Congress—
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go to www.digitalpreservation.gov to see their efforts119—or might be
the nascent Digital Public Library of America. And we are likely to see
efforts across the globe, such as europeana.eu.120
We should step back briefly to consider the broader idea of public
property and then situate the public domain in that notion. There is a
long-standing idea that certain property is held in a public trust by the
government. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted recently: “The public
trust doctrine is of ancient origin. Its roots trace to Roman civil law and
its principles can be found in the English common law on public navigation
and fishing rights over tidal lands and in the state laws of this country.”121
The public trust doctrine operates today to police the boundary between
private property and the rights of the public, most frequently on waterways
and beaches.122 At its core, this is the idea of a public commons open to
all.
We speak about copyright’s public domain in exactly those terms, but
that is a shorthand and one that ignores both the private origins of the
public domain and the differences that arise between intellectual property
and physical property given the nonrivalnous of the former and the limited
nature of the latter. As the public trust fights over beaches demonstrate,
beach space is scarce and if a private party is able to fence off part of the
beach, the balance of the public loses real access to the beach.
Copyright’s public domain doesn’t operate that way. First, the content
that enters the public domain started its life as private content. The
underlying objects in which the work was embodied—paper for years
but other media today—were typically privately owned. The public had
no right to the blank paper, and our hypothetical author’s ownership of
the paper no more removed it from the public than occurs with any other
private property. The public’s right to that paper didn’t change when words
were first put on paper. Under U.S. copyright law before 1976, an author
could create a work and never publish it and thereby retain a perpetual
common-law copyright under state law.123 These private works would
never enter the public domain. So unlike the waterways that make up the
119. Digital Preservation, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.digitalpreservation.gov/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
120. About Us, EUROPEANA, http://www.europeana.eu/portal/aboutus.html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2012).
121. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1234 (2012).
122. See, e.g., Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d
112, 128 (N.J. 2005).
123. For discussion, see Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 347 (1908).
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core of the public trust doctrine, the works that make it into copyright’s
public domain first started in private hands and were in no sense somehow
removed from public hands.124
We then turn to the nonrivalnous of intellectual property. As noted
before, moving beachfront property out of public hands reduces the public’s
ability to access that land. In contrast, allowing digitizers to enforce the
restrictions that emerge from the tools described in Part IV.B above does
not remove access to the public domain from the public.125 The key
word there is remove, as the restrictions clearly limit access relative to
the full, unfettered access that would occur from a truly public public
domain. After digitization, the public’s access to the public domain is
almost always expanded: the public continues to have whatever prior
access it had to the physical objects in which the public domain is
embedded, plus the public picks up the access created by the digitizer.
There are, to be sure, wrinkles here. We do need to attend to the extent
to which holders of public domain objects exit from those objects given
the digitization. It is expensive for libraries to manage these physical
objects and they may deaccess them—that is libraryspeak for tossing
them—given the existence of digital alternatives.
All of that suggests why there is some push for a true public public
domain in the form of a national—international?—digital public library.
Private digitization will come with restrictions, and it isn’t clear that anyone
is doing a good job of internalizing the issue of how broad access to the
public domain should be achieved. Individual libraries destroying old
newspapers won’t take into account the way in which that action deprives
the public of public domain access. There is no obvious steward for the
public domain.
A public digital library could take many forms. A full-blown undertaking
would mean that the library would create its own search engine for
content and would undertake all of the work required to stock the library
with digital content. That would mean contracts with current, active
copyright holders, some approach to orphan works, and scanning of the
public domain. The government would also have to build search
technology or contract for it. A much more modest effort would be a
scanned corpus created by the government and made available to all

124. Given that, as might be expected, the effort to extend the public trust doctrine to
copyright’s public domain has so far been unsuccessful. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d
1, 3–4 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003). For additional discussion, see Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public
Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright in a Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647 (2000).
125. See supra Part IV.B.
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users. The government could host those works but could also allow private
parties to incorporate those scans into their own offerings.
Describing a public digital library is obviously a large topic, and I
want to avoid it here, save for one point, namely the relationship between
access to the public domain and copyright’s deposit requirement. Our
first federal copyright statute, the 1790 Copyright Act, brought with it a dual
deposit requirement. Authors were required to deposit a copy of the
work prior to publication with their local district court and within six
months after publication with the Secretary of State.126 Section 407 sets
out the current version of the deposit requirement.127 Copyright owners
are required to deposit with the Copyright Office two copies of the work
within three months of publication, unless the Register of Copyrights has
exempted the work from the deposit requirement.128
The critical question is whether we should think that the deposit
requirement is by design or effect the way in which we stock our digital
public library. We could imagine this as central quid pro quo for copyright
protection: authors would receive copyright protection but do so subject
to the requirement that they turn over multiple copies of their work to
the government. You can easily imagine how we might adjust this right.
At one extreme, the deposit copies would go instantly into our digital
public library and would be available for check out. If we treated these as
we would physical books, the digital book could be accessed only once it
was returned by the prior user. Of course, the transaction costs of check out
and return would be much lower; not quite a friction-free environment,
but close.
An alternative approach would be to treat the deposit copies as just
stocking the public domain in advance. Think of the deposit copies as a
type of public domain escrow. In-copyright works in the escrow wouldn’t
be available for use by the public until they entered the public domain.
At that point, the access problem would be solved and we would
presumably allow downloading and use of these public domain works
without restriction.

126. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, §§ 3–4, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 407 (2006)).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 407.
128. Id.; see also Mandatory Deposit, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/
help/faq/mandatory_deposit.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2011) (describing mandatory
deposit requirement and possible exceptions).

1213

The library idea and the public domain escrow notion are obviously
quite different. The library could operate as a powerful tax on copyrighted
works and a tax borne exclusively by authors. The books in the digital
library would substitute for books that would otherwise be purchased by
libraries and might substitute for private purchases as well. We don’t
typically have special in-kind taxes. Law professors need not go teach
free law classes as a condition for having full rights to the revenues
generated by their regular teaching of classes. The deposit requirement
as in-kind tax is a vision of copyright as a special kind of government
protection—privilege and not right—and given that status as a privilege,
one that the government is entitled to attach conditions to. The public
domain escrow notion recognizes that assembling the public domain is
real work with substantial public benefits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like the future, as the saying goes, the public domain is already here,
it is just unevenly distributed. The public domain is bound to physical
artifacts, and even though the public domain is free to use to all, its physical
instantiation is tied to particular locations. In some cases, for especially
rare works, access may be particularly limited.
But with the rise of mass digitization, actual access to the public
domain is growing dramatically. But amassing, digitizing, and hosting
the public domain takes real resources, and it is hardly surprising that the
entities doing this work simultaneously impose restrictions on the use of
the public domain. In turn, how law responds to those restrictions will
determine the structure of competition over the use and delivery of the
public domain.
In structuring that competition, we are likely to encounter a wide range of
legal tools that implicate that competition. These include the laws of
contract, copyright, the DMCA, and the CFAA. Freestanding decisions
will be made in each of these areas, often without careful consideration
of the consequences for the potential public domain competition that
animates this Article.

1214

